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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that households who enter retirement with low wealth consistently followed non-
permanent income consumption rules during their working years. Using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), household wealth in 1989 is predicted for a sample of 50-65 year olds using both
current and past income, occupation, demographic, employment, and health characteristics. Using
the residuals from this first stage regression, the sample of pre-retired households is subsetted into
households who save 'lower' than predicted and all other households. The panel component of the
PSID is then used to analyze the consumption behavior of these households early in their lifecycle.
It is shown that these low pre-retirement wealth households had consumption growth that responded
to predictable changes in income during their early working years. No such behavior was found
among the other pre-retired households. Moreover, the low wealth residual households responded
both to predictable income increases as well as predictable income declines, a result that is
inconsistent with a liquidity constraints explanation. After ruling out other theories of consumption
to explain these facts, it is concluded that households who entered retirement with lower than
predicted wealth consistently followed near sighted consumption plans during their working lives.
Erik Hurst
University of Chicago





Grasshoppers, Ants and Pre-Retirement Wealth: 
A Test of Permanent Income Consumers 
 
It was wintertime, the ants’ store of grain had got wet and they were laying it 
out to dry.  A hungry grasshopper asked them to give it something to eat.  
‘Why did you not store food in the summer like us?’ the ants asked.  ‘I hadn’t 
time’, it replied.  ‘I was too busy making sweet music.’  The ants laughed at 
the grasshopper.  ‘Very well’, they said.  ‘Since you piped in the summer, now 
dance in the winter’.  
– Aesop’s Fable 
 
  It is well documented that, conditional on lifetime income, wealth varies dramatically across 
households entering retirement (Gustman and Juster, 1996; Smith, 1997; Hurst, Luoh and 
Stafford, 1998; Venti and Wise, 1998 and 2000; Lusardi, 2002).   While many authors have 
attempted to explain this fact (Venti and Wise, 2000; Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001; 
Hurd and Zissimpopoulos, 2002), the approach taken in this paper is quite different.
1  In this 
paper, I directly examine the relationship between households’ pre-retirement wealth and their 
consumption behavior while young.   I find that households who entered retirement with much 
lower than predicted wealth did not follow permanent income consumption rules during their 
working years; their year-to-year consumption growth responded strongly to predictable income 
changes.   No such behavior was evident in the other group of pre-retired households who had 
higher wealth conditional on observables.  After ruling out other theories of consumption, 
including the existence of binding liquidity constraints, I conclude that those households who are 
most likely to under-save for retirement do so, at least in part, because they follow myopic 
consumption rules during their working years. 
                                                      
1 There is an additional literature which analyzes the adequacy of pre-retired household wealth by comparing simulated optimal 
saving behavior from a calibrated lifecycle model to actual household data (Bernheim, 1992 and 1997; Bernheim and Scholz, 
1993).   The conclusion of these papers is that a large fraction of households have wealth levels that will leave them unprepared 
to sustain consumption during retirement.  More recently, Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and Scholz, Seshardri, and 
Khitatrakun (2003) maintain that it is possible to account for much of the observed variation in pre-retirement wealth across 
households using a life-cycle model with heterogeneous earnings shocks and pension coverage.  However, both papers conclude 
that approximately 20% of the pre-retired population under-save for retirement.  
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  Specifically, in the first part of the paper, I segment 50-65 year old households in the 1989 
Wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) by residuals from a regression of observed 
household wealth on a vector of current and historical income, employment, demographic and 
health controls.  Doing so, allows me to isolate households with similar opportunities to save.  I 
classify households within the bottom twenty percent of residuals from this first stage regression 
as having ‘lower than normal’ wealth.  In the latter portion of the paper, I justify the use of the 
twenty percent cutoff.   By construction, households with lower than normal pre-retired wealth 
are identical to other pre-retired households along income, health, employment, pension and 
demographic characteristics.  However, these households with low pre-retirement wealth 
residuals experienced a much larger consumption decline upon their subsequent retirement.   
Their consumption decline during retirement was twice as large, on average, compared to their 
counterparts with similar pre-retirement income trajectories, but higher pre-retirement wealth.   
The dramatic decline in consumption at retirement for households with lower-than-normal 
wealth is consistent with the hypothesis that these households were ill-prepared for retirement.  
  The innovation of the paper comes next.  Using the panel dimension of the PSID, I am able 
to observe the income and consumption behavior of these pre-retired households over a majority 
of their working years.  I then test whether households who appear to violate the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis (PIH) by accumulating too little wealth to sustain consumption in retirement 
also violate the PIH while young.  Performing standard excess sensitivity tests, I am able to 
reject that households with lower than normal pre-retired wealth behave as standard permanent 
income consumers while young.  I find that the consumption growth of households with lower 
than normal pre-retirement savings responds strongly to predictable income changes.   The 
consumption of other pre-retired households does not respond in any way to predictable income  
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changes.  Those households entering retirement with little wealth relative to their income, health 
and demographic trajectories appear to be following rule of thumb consumption plans during 
their working years. 
  The fact that consumption responds to predictable income changes for households with little 
pre-retirement wealth - relative to observables - is not the result of liquidity constraints.   
Liquidity constraints may prevent a household from borrowing to smooth their consumption 
when income is predicted to increase.  As a result, their consumption growth may track 
predictable income growth.  However, liquidity constraints do not prevent households from 
smoothing predictable income declines (Altonji and Siow (1987), Zeldes (1989) and Shea 
(1995)).   If the household realizes that their income is going to decline in the near future, 
nothing prevents them from saving to smooth their marginal utility of consumption over time.  I 
find that the consumption of households with relatively little retirement savings responds 
similarly (in terms of magnitude) to both predictable income increases and predictable income 
declines.   These results indicate that liquidity constraints are not the cause of the failure of the 
permanent income hypothesis during working years for households with little pre-retirement 
wealth.   Furthermore, the substitutability between consumption and leisure is not driving the 
results.  Households with lower than normal wealth entering retirement had consumption profiles 
while young that responded to predictable income changes even after directly controlling for 
changes in work hours. 
  This paper provides a set of facts that describe at least two different types of households.  
Most households in the population behave according to the Permanent Income Hypothesis.   
However, there is a segment of households who enter retirement with very low wealth even after 
controlling for differences in income, demographic, employment and health histories.  These  
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same households experience a large consumption decline at the onset of retirement, relative to 
other pre-retired households.  Additionally, these households have consumption profiles that 
respond to predictable income shocks throughout their working years.  Many alternative theories 
can explain a subset of the above behaviors, but very few theories can jointly explain them all.  
Specifically, it is shown that the behaviors of these low wealth, pre-retired households are 
inconsistent with consumption theories such as precautionary savings (Deaton, 1992; Carroll, 
1997) or habit formation (Deaton, 1992).    These behaviors, however, are consistent with either 
rule-of-thumb consumption (Campbell and Makiw, 1989) or hyperbolic consumers (Laibson, 
1997).   In either case, the households display a lack of planning behavior;  under the former 
theory, the households are myopic and do not attempt to plan for the future, while under the 
latter theory, the households attempt to plan, but are incapable of committing themselves to carry 
out those plans. 
  As supporting evidence that differences in planning propensities are driving the differences 
in behavior between the two groups, I find that these households with low wealth entering 
retirement, conditioned on lifecycle factors, were aware of their near-sighted behavior nearly two 
decades prior to their retirement.  In 1972, questions were asked of all PSID respondents about 1) 
their propensity to plan for the future, 2) carry out their plans for the future and 3) their 
propensity to spend their income rather than save it.  The answers to such questions are definitely 
noisy measures of household behavior.  However, households who entered retirement with lower 
than normal savings were much less likely to report that they plan for the future, were much less 
likely to report that they carry out their plans and were much more likely to report that they 
spend their income rather than save it.     
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  At the beginning of the paper, a classic fable by Aesop is recounted.   In the fable, a sharp 
distinction is drawn between ants, who saved during their summer (i.e., working years) to sustain 
consumption during their winter (i.e., retirement), and grasshoppers, who saved little for their 
future period of low earnings.  The results shown in this paper confirm Aesop’s proposition; 
within an economy, consumers are of different types.  Some households are forward looking and 
behave according to the Permanent Income Hypothesis.  Others, however, lack either the desire 
or the ability to plan for the future.  When constructing economic models, it is often misguided to 
assume all households follow similar consumption rules.  With respect to retirement saving, 
while it is true that the majority of households appear to follow permanent income consumption 
rules, approximately 20% of the population behaves as ‘economic grasshoppers’.   The 
consumption of such households closely tracks their income during their working years leaving 
them with little financial wealth as they enter retirement.   Given their lack of planning, such 
households must sharply decrease consumption – and by extension utility – at the time of 
retirement.       
  This paper adds to a growing literature which assesses the effects of planning behavior on 
household wealth accumulation (Lusardi, 1999, 2002, 2003a; Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy, 2003).    
Lusardi (2002) uses data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to show that 1/3 of 
households nearing retirement report that they have “hardly thought” about retirement.  These 
households have much lower wealth levels than households who reported thinking a lot about 
retirement.  Similarly, Ameriks et. al. (2003) use special surveys of TIAA-CREF investors to 
show that households who self report spending time financially planning for retirement have 
higher wealth than households who self report spending little time financially planning.   Also, 
both Bernheim and Garrett (2003) and Lusardi (2003b) find positive causal effects between  
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attending firm sponsored retirement planning seminars and retirement wealth.  Collectively, 
there exists evidence that planning can foster higher savings. 
II.  Segmenting Pre-Retired Households By Wealth Residuals 
  The purpose of this section is to identify pre-retired households with lower than ‘normal’ 
wealth.  Household wealth, at the time of retirement, is a function of economic factors (income, 
demographics, health shocks, interest rates) and individual decision factors (saving propensities, 
portfolio allocation).  In order to explore household planning behavior, households who had 
similar opportunities to save over their lifetime are compared.  Using the 1989 Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), where there are multiple decades of past income, demographic and 
health data for each household, pre-retired households are segmented by whether they have 
higher or lower wealth than other households who experienced similar economic, demographic, 
and health histories.   
A.  Segmenting Pre-Retired Households  
  To start, a cross section of pre-retired households who were in the PSID during the 1989 
survey were examined.  Pre-retired households are defined to be households with a non-retired 
head between the age of 50 and 65.  The analysis year of 1989 was chosen purposefully.  While 
the PSID has collected income, employment and demographic information in all survey years 
since its inception in 1968, information on wealth and savings were only asked at five-year 
intervals starting in 1984 through 1999.   Since 1999, the PSID has tracked household wealth 
every other year.  Consequently, cross-sectional studies of wealth using PSID data are limited to 
the years of 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2001 where the 2001 data is the most recent PSID data 
made available.   Given the nature of the tests that I perform below, I need to follow the pre-
retired households backwards in time (to observe their consumption behavior during their  
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working years) as well as to follow the households into the future (to observe their consumption 
behavior around the period when they subsequently retire).  For these reasons, 1989 was chosen 
as the year in which pre-retired households were segmented by their conditional wealth levels.
2  
Additionally, as discussed in the Data Appendix, certain pension questions used in the wealth 
prediction equation were asked only in 1989.  Given the sample design of the PSID, nearly all 
1989 pre-retired households had one family member participate in the PSID every year since the 
survey’s inception in 1968.  As a result, there are almost twenty years of income, employment, 
demographics and health data for each pre-retired household in the 1989 PSID.  
  The analysis sample was restricted to include only those households who had positive 1989 
wealth.  Given that pre-retired households are well into their lifecycle, this requirement was not 
overly restrictive.  Less than 4% of non-retired 50-65 year olds in the 1989 PSID had zero or 
negative wealth.  The positive wealth restriction was imposed so that the log of wealth can be 
used as the dependent variable in subsequent regressions. 
 The  PSID wealth supplements contain information on the household’s investment in real 
estate (including main home), vehicles, farms, businesses, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, saving 
and checking accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, 
Treasury bills, IRAs, bond funds, cash value of life insurance policies, valuable collections for 
investment purposes, and rights in a trust or estate, mortgage debt, credit card debt, and other 
outstanding collateralized and non-collateralized debt.   The measure of wealth used in this paper 
is the sum of all of the above asset measures less all of the above debt measures.   For a full 
discussion of the PSID wealth data, see Hurst, Luoh and Stafford (1998).    
                                                      
2 The main results of the paper carry through if the 1984 wealth data is used to segment pre-retired households by their wealth 
residuals.   
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 The  PSID wealth supplements have one major drawback when used to assess retirement 
savings.  Through the late 1990s, the PSID did not ask explicitly ask households about their 
wealth in either private or public pensions.  In 1989, however, this problem can be partially 
alleviated.  The 1989 PSID respondents were asked questions about their expectations of the 
percentage of their pre-retirement yearly labor earnings that would be replaced by all household 
pension plans (including social security) during retirement.  Using this information, one can 
account for expected differences in pension coverage across households.   
  To identify households who saved little given their economic opportunities, the following 
regression was estimated:   
 
      W i,1989  =  φ0 + φ1 Xi,,1989 + φ2 Zi,historical  + ηi,1989  ,    (1)   
 
where Wi,1989 is the log of household i’s net wealth in 1989, Xi, 1989 is a vector of household i’s 
1989 income, employment, demographic, and health controls, and Zi,historicial  is a vector of 
household i’s historical income, employment, demographic and health controls.   The error term, 
ηi,1989, represents the portion of current household log wealth that is unexplained by the X and Z 
controls.   
  The Data Appendix details the specific controls used in estimating regression (1).   Briefly, 
Xi,1989 includes the current age of the household head, age squared, dummies for the household 
head’s race, marital status, educational attainment, occupation, industry and family composition, 
a quadratic in household current total labor income, dummies for the household head and 
“wife’s” current health and employment status, and the household’s self reported expectation of  
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their pension replacement rate.
3    Zi,historical  includes a quadratic in average household labor 
income between 1980 and 1987, a quadratic in average household labor income between 1974 
and 1979, the change in labor income between 1980 and 1988, the coefficient of variation of 
income over 1975 and 1989, and health and unemployment shocks experienced by the head and 
the wife between 1980 and 1988.  In some specifications, health and unemployment shocks 
experienced by the household in the 1970s were included.  These variables provided no 
additional explanatory power to the regression and, as a result, were omitted from the base 
specification.  
  The residuals from (1), ηi,1989, provide a measure of whether the household has saved more 
or less than households with similar economic, demographic, employment, and health 
trajectories.  The adjusted R-squared from (1) was 0.53 indicating that the controls included 
captured a majority of the variation in wealth across households.  Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of 1989 wealth residuals for the sample of 1989 pre-retired households.  Any 
classification of households into two groups based on these wealth residuals is in some sense 
arbitrary.   To begin, I segment households with the lowest 20% of residuals as having low 
“normalized” wealth.  These households correspond to the proverbial economic grasshoppers 
discussed above.  My comparison group will be all other pre-retired households in the sample 
(the proverbial economic ants).   
 The  20
th percentile cutoff is chosen given that: 1) Hall and Mishkin (1982) find that about 
twenty percent of the population appears to be rule of thumb and 2) both Engen et al. (1999) and 
Scholz et al. (2003) find that about 20% of households dramatically under save for retirement. 
However, in the sections that follow, I explore the robustness of my results when the cutoff is 
                                                      
3  The PSID surveys its respondents in the spring of the year.  During the 1989 survey year, households are asked about their 
wealth (spring 1989) and about the previous year of income (1988 income).  As a result, when predicting 1989 wealth, 1988 
income is the appropriate income measure.  
  9




th percentile of the residual distribution.    For my sample, 
based on the first stage regression, the corresponding cutoffs of the log pre-retirement wealth 




th and the 50
th percentiles of the wealth residual distributions 
are, respectively, -1.32, -0.73, -0.36, -0.12, and 0.12.  As we will see in the following sections, 
the twenty percent cutoff is well justified. 
  These residuals, however, should not be strictly interpreted as a measure of a household’s 
planning propensity because many of the controls in equation (1) are a function of the extent to 
which individuals are forward looking.  For example, education affects income (the opportunity 
to save).  However, education is also the result of household forward looking behavior.  The fact 
that wealth differs across households despite the inclusion of these controls suggests that I have 
isolated groups of households who have different saving propensities above and beyond the 
extent that these saving propensities are correlated with the controls included in X and Z.   The 
alternative would be to include only controls which are totally exogenous to the propensity to 
plan.   However, there are very few controls that are truly exogenous.  Even age, given its 
relationship to health, is potentially a proxy for household planning behavior.  Using very few 
controls in equation (1) would leave the results discussed below open to the criticism that the 
sample selection procedure isolated households who had different opportunities to save.  By 
including controls that may also proxy for household planning propensity into equation (1), 
however, my estimates below may underestimate the amount of ‘grasshopper’ behavior in the 
sample.  Given this, the estimates below should be treated as lower bounds.  In Section IV, the 
same analysis is performed on samples split using actual wealth levels as opposed to the wealth 
residuals.  In that section, the results of the two approaches are compared.  Foreshadowing the  
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results, the qualitative conclusions of the paper are not sensitive to the control variables included 
in equation (1).  The reason for the similarity in results is discussed in Section IV. 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the two samples of pre-retired households where 
the sample is split based on the first stage wealth residuals estimated from (1).   Aside from 
wealth, the two samples look identical along income, demographic and health histories.  Given 
the sample selection procedure, this result should not be surprising.
4 
B.  Differences in Subsequent Retirement Behavior By Wealth Residual Groups 
  If differences in planning ability across households were driving the difference in 
normalized pre-retirement wealth across households, we would expect to see subsequent 
differences in retirement behavior.  Households who accumulated too little wealth for retirement 
should react to the realization that they were ill prepared by: 1) reducing their consumption in 
retirement and/or 2) delaying the time of their retirement (or working a part time job after 
retiring). 
  There are potentially two interrelated drawbacks to comparing the subsequent retirement 
behavior of the households with low wealth residuals and all other pre-retired households.  First, 
given that the 1999 PSID is the most recent data available for public use, it is not possible to 
observe all households actually retiring.  A household who was 50 in 1989 will likely not retire 
until the mid 2000s.  Second, and potentially more important, those who retire early may be a 
selected sample.   One may imagine that those households with very low wealth would delay 
their retirement relative to other households.  There is no information, however, to suggest that 
the households in the two pre-retirement wealth residual groups retire at different ages.  Panel A 
of Table 2 shows that the average age of retirement, conditional on retiring, is between 62 and 63 
                                                      
4 Unless otherwise specified, all dollar values reported in the paper are in 1989 dollars.  
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years old for both those with low and high first stage 1989 pre-retirement wealth residuals.   Self-
reported retirement status is used to define household retirement behavior.  Furthermore, similar 
percentages of both groups were observed actually retiring before 1999 (43% of ants and 38% of 
grasshoppers).  Given the incentives in public and private pension systems and the fact that the 
average household in each group is similar along occupation, education and income dimensions, 
it is not surprising that the retirement age is similar between the two groups.  However, as we 
show below, the propensity to take a part-time job in retirement does differ between the two 
groups. 
  The only measure of consumption, aside from housing expenditures, that the PSID directly 
asks its respondents about is their food consumption.
5  Specifically, in all years between 1970 
and 1987 and all survey years between 1990 and 1999, households were asked to report the 
amount that that they spent on food at home and food away from home during the previous 
month.  Consistent with the hypothesis that our group of low residual households are ill prepared 
for retirement, it is found that such households have much larger declines in consumption upon 
retirement.  Table 2 shows the level of food consumption averaged over the three years preceding 
retirement, the level of food consumption averaged over the three years after retiring, and the 
mean and median percentage decline in consumption associated with retirement for those 
households that retired.  The percentage decline compares the three year average consumption 
prior to retirement to the three year average after retirement for each household who retired and 
then averaged the percentage declines over all households.   
                                                      
5 Many authors examining consumption in the PSID use the ‘Skinner’ measure of consumption (Skinner, 1987).  The Skinner 
consumption measure optimally weights food consumption with measures of housing expenditures to come up with a total 
measure of consumption.  However, when examining changes in consumption, all the time series variation in the Skinner 
consumption measure comes from either the variation in food consumption or the variation in housing expenditures.  Given that 
housing expenditures may be directly related to a household’s level of wealth (because of liquidity constraints in the housing 
market), it is inappropriate to use the Skinner consumption measure when estimating consumption Euler equations when the 
samples are split based on wealth.  For this reason, in this paper, I only focus on food consumption and do not include housing 
expenditures in my PSID consumption measure.  
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  The mean consumption levels prior to retirement for both groups of households were quite 
similar (second row of Table 2).  However, after retirement, those with low pre-retired wealth 
residuals consumed $2,900 of food per year while those with the higher wealth residuals 
consumed over $3,700 of food per year.  The average decline in consumption for the low wealth 
residuals households was 11%, while the other group, on average, only decreased their 
consumption during retirement by 3%.  The median decline in consumption at retirement showed 
a similar pattern:  low wealth pre-retired households experienced nearly a 20% consumption 
decline compared to a 11% decline for the other households.  The fact that the average household 
experiences a consumption decline during retirement is consistent with almost all existing 
empirical work (see, Banks, Blundell and Tanner, 2000; Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001, 
Aguiar and Hurst, 2003; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003).
6  Furthermore, Bernheim et al. (2002) also 
finds that low wealth households experience much larger consumption expenditure declines at 
the onset of retirement.   
  The results in Table 2 are based on very few low wealth residual households who were 
observed to subsequently retire.  As seen in Table 2, the average decline in consumption between 
the two samples is not statistically different from each other at standard levels.  The question is 
whether the lack of significance is due to low power or is it because there is no actual difference 
in behavior between the two groups.  To explore the robustness of these results, the exact same 
analysis was performed using 1984 wealth to split the sample.
7  Doing so allowed many more 
households who actually retired between 1984 and 1999 to be observed.  The results are shown 
in Appendix Table A1 and are nearly identical to the results shown in Table 2.  Low residual 
                                                      
6 Both Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) and Aguiar and Hurst (2003) provide evidence that a large portion of the decline in 
expenditure – particularly food expenditure - associated with retirement for the median household is the result of a switch 
towards home production.  Aguiar and Hurst show that while food expenditure falls for the average households by 10-20%, food 
consumption, measured via food diaries, does not change at the onset of retirement. 
7 For a sample of non-retired, 50-65 year olds in 1984, 1984 log wealth was regressed on the full set of variables used to segment 
the 1989 pre-retired households, except all control variables were lagged 5 years.    
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households experienced a consumption decline that was nearly twice as large as the other pre-
retired households.   However, these average and median declines are statistically different from 
each other at standard levels of significance.  The results from Table 2 and Appendix Table A1 
document large differences in consumption declines between the two groups at the time of 
retirement. 
  While the average household in each group retire at similar ages, there is evidence that the 
low wealth residual households take less leisure in retirement.  Households in the bottom 20% of 
residuals and the remaining 80% of residuals both work similar average annual hours during the 
three years prior to retirement (1,631 hours vs 1,806 hours, p-value of difference = 0.11).     
However, during the three years after retirement, low wealth households work 413 hours 
annually (on average) compared to 240 annually for high wealth households (p-value of 
difference = 0.05).   The average decline in work hours is 11 percentage points less for low 
wealth residual households (75% decline vs. 86% decline, p-value of difference = 0.03).  These 
work hours result from the retired household working a part-time job.  So, even though the low 
wealth residual and high wealth residual households retire at a similar age, the low wealth 
residual households are much more likely to work after their self reported age of retirement.  
These results can be reconciled given institutional incentives for households to retire between the 
ages of 63 and 65.    
 
III.    Testing For Differences in PIH Behavior Across Wealth Residual Groups 
  The large decline in consumption at retirement for low wealth households seems at odds 
with the standard permanent income hypothesis (PIH) model (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954;  
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Friedman, 1957).
8  Given that the date of retirement is largely forecastable, forward looking 
households should accumulate enough wealth so as to sustain consumption during retirement.  In 
this section, I explicitly test whether the low wealth residual households behaved as permanent 
income consumers in the decades prior to retirement.  In other words, do low wealth pre-retired 
households seem to violate the PIH throughout their lives or only at the time of retirement?   
  According to the PIH with perfect capital markets and patient consumers, expected income 
growth between period t and t+1 should not have statistical power in predicting consumption 
growth between period t and t+1 (Hall 1978).   Any predictable future changes in the 
household’s income stream should already be incorporated into the household’s current 
consumption plan.   Linking household retirement wealth with their consumption behavior while 
young is the innovation of this paper. 
 A.   Empirically Testing for Permanent Income Consumption Behavior 
  In this sub-section, I outline the standard PIH model as presented in (1989).  I then use this 
model to test for differing consumption behavior between groups of households defined by their 
pre-retirement wealth residuals.  
















Θ+ Θ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∑          (2) 
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8 If consumption and leisure are substitutes, the PIH model could predict a large consumption decline at retirement.  This 
proposition is tested in Section V.  
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where i indexes households, k indexes household type (i.e., whether or not the household belongs 
to the low pre-retirement wealth residual group) and t indexes time; Cikt,  Xikt,  and  Yikt are, 
respectively, household i’s consumption, cash on hand for consumption, and household income 
in period t; rik,t+1 is the household specific after tax interest rate between years t and t+1 and δk is 
the discount rate that pertains to a household of type k.  The household’s utility function is of the 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion form with a time invariant coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
ρk,, and a time invariant time discount rate, δk.  Both ρ and δ are allowed to differ by household 
type but are assumed constant within each type.  Utility of the household is also dependent upon 
the household’s tastes in period t, Θikt.  Household income can be decomposed into two parts; a 
permanent component (Pikt) and a transitory component (Vikt).   Permanent income in the current 
period is equal to permanent income in the previous period multiplied by a nonstochastic growth 
factor (gik), specific to the household, and a stochastic shock (Nikt).   The stochastic components 
to income {Nikt,Vikt} are assumed to be independently and identically distributed jointly 




  The Euler Equation to the above optimization problem can be estimated with the familiar 
specification (see, among others, Shapiro (1984), Zeldes (1989) and Lawrance (1991)):
9 
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9  The solution to this model is discussed in Zeldes (1989).  Also, see Lawrance (1991) for a discussion of estimating this 
consumption Euler equation when consumption is measured with error.  
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where  ,1 ,1 ln ik t ik t qq
•
+ + =∆ , for any variable q, εik,t+1 is the mean zero expectations forecast error, 
and ωik
2 is the variance of the forecast error.  The law of iterated expectations implies that εik,t+1 
is uncorrelated with any variable known at time t (Hall, 1978). 
  Similar to Zeldes (1989), household tastes are defined according to the following: 
         
2
012 , 1 ln( ) ikt k ikt k ikt k ikt ik t ik t b age b age b famsize τµ ξ + Θ= + + + + +    (4) 
where ageikt is the age of the household head in year t and famsizeit represents the number of 
members in the household in year t.  The effects of age and family size on the taste shifter are 
allowed to differ by household type, k.  The unobservable (to the econometrician) component of 
the taste shifter includes a family fixed component which is constant over time for any family 
within a type (τi), an aggregate component that is constant across types and families but varies 
across time (µt), and a remaining component that is orthogonal to the other two (ξikt).
10, 11  
Substituting (4) into (3), one gets: 
 
*
,1 01 , 12 3 1 , 1 ,1 ln 1 ) ik t k k ik t k k ikt t t ik t ik t C ( r famsize age λλ λ λ µµ ε
••
+ ++ + + =+ + + + +− +  (5) 
where  ε
*
ik,t+1 = εik,t+1 + (ξik,t+1 - ξikt)/ρk and has mean zero.  The constant, λ0k, can be expressed as 
(δk - ωik
2/2 + b0k + b1k)/ρk.  The coefficient λ1k in (5) is equal to (1/ρk).
12 
  As outlined in the previous section, (5) will be jointly estimated for the two different sub-
populations of households - those with low first stage pre-retired wealth residuals and all other 
households.   Formally, the following equation allows for the parameters of (5) to differ 
accordingly between the two groups of households: 
                                                      
10   Innovations to ξikt are assumed to be persistent such that Et[ξik,t+1 - ξikt] equals zero. 
11  Allowing a component which varies by type over time (ψkt) did not alter the results presented below in any way.  
12  Given that changes in family size are planned in advance, ∆ln famsizeit is assumed to be uncorrelated with ε
*
i,t+1.  The 
following results were also run omitting changes in family size as a control but with the growth in per capita consumption as the 
dependent variable.  The results were unchanged.  
  17
 
,1 0 1 20 2 , 1 3 20 , 1 4 ,1
*
52 0 6 72 0 , 1 ,1
ln 1 ) ln 1 )
                 
ik t ik t ik t ik t
ikt ikt Year ik t ik t
C D ( r D ( r famsize
D famsize age D age D
αα α α α
αα α ϕ ε
• •
+ <+ < + +
•
<< + +
=+ + + + + +
++ + + +
 (6) 
where D<20 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has a first stage wealth residual 
(defined in the previous section) in the lowest twenty percent of the wealth residual distribution.  
Including the low residual dummies and these dummies interacted with the interest rate, age and 
family size allows for preference parameters (δ and ρ), as well as the impact of taste shifters (b1 
and b2), to differ across the two groups.  DYear is a vector of year dummies which are included to 
account for aggregate shocks which affect both types of households.  
  To test whether household consumption responds to predictable changes in income, the 
following regression can be estimated: 
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•
+ is the predictable component of income growth rate between t and t+1 estimated 
simultaneously with (7).
13,14  If households are not sufficiently ‘impatient’, the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis predicts that consumption growth between periods t and t+1 should be 
unaffected by forecastable changes in income between periods t and t+1.
15  Any predictable 
                                                      
13   This procedure to test for the excess sensitivity of consumption is standard in the literature.  See Browning and Lusardi (1996) 
and the cites within. 
14   It has been suggested that the wealth residual itself, as opposed to the wealth dummy, D<20, should be interacted with the 
predictable component of income in (7).  Given the theory, this would be inappropriate.  The relationship between the wealth 
residual and the response of consumption to predictable income changes is non-linear.  If the permanent income hypothesis is 
correct, the coefficient on the predictable income change should be zero for most households and positive for others.  One could, 
in principle, include higher powers of the residual interacted with the predictable component of income growth to capture the 
non-linear relationship.  For simplicity, and ease of exposition, the wealth dummy approach is used in this paper.  In Section IV 
and in Table 5, the non-linear relationship between the wealth residuals and the violation of the PIH is explored more fully. 
15 ‘Impatient’ households are classified as households who wish to borrow, all else equal, in the current period.  Formally, 
households are deemed ‘impatient’ if the following condition is satisfied: γk (ri,t+1-δk) + (ρk/2) σi,N
2 < gi - σi,N
2/2.  This impatience 
condition is necessary to generate buffer stock saving behavior (Carroll, 1997).  Below, I rule out buffer stock saving behavior as 
an explanation for the results presented in this and previous sections.  
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change in income should already be included in the household’s consumption plan.  If either β1 
or β2 is positive and significant, predictable income growth has statistical power in predicting 
consumption growth and the standard Permanent Income Hypothesis with no liquidity 
constraints and patient consumers can be rejected.
16        
  In order for the two stage least squares estimation of (7) to yield unbiased estimates of β1 
and β2, both the predictable income growth components and the dummy indicating the bottom 
20% of the pre-retirement wealth distribution have to be independent of the regression error 
term.  In the following empirical work, I will instrument for a household’s predictable 
component of income growth using four lags of income growth, excluding the first lag.
17   By 
definition, these lagged variables are orthogonal to the error term, ε*i,t+1.   
  The standard assumption made about the error structure when estimating consumption Euler 
equations is that 
*
,1 [] 0 ti k t t E ε + Ω=∀k and ∀t, where Ωt is all information known at time t.  
However, given the above sample selection procedure, 
*
,1 2 0 [] ti k t ED ε +<need not equal zero within 
each wealth residual group.  For example, it is possible that households with low wealth 
residuals repeatedly received poor income draws throughout their lifetime.  In other words, these 
households may have been perpetually unlucky.  Once the subsequent period came, they realized 
bad income growth, adjusted their consumption downward, and continued to expect high income 
growth in the following period.  Such households who were persistently unlucky (or persistently 
over optimistic) could end up in retirement with little wealth.  Furthermore, their expectations 
about future income growth would not be ascertained from lagged income growth.  In each 
period, they expected higher future income growth and realized lower income growth.  Their 
expectations, on average, and their realizations, on average, would not be equal for perpetually 
                                                      
16 We will specifically test for the existence of liquidity constraints in the following section. 
17  The first stage regression showing the validity of the instruments is discussed in the following section.  
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unlucky households.  Such a situation could cause households with negative realizations of ε* in 
years prior to 1989 to have low wealth in 1989.   
  However, under rather general assumptions, estimating (7) will still yield unbiased estimates 
of β1 and β2.  The reason for this is that (7) includes a dummy variable indicating differences in 
type across households, D<20.  If the low residual group had persistently low-income realizations 
(relative to their expectations), the lagged income growth controls will persistently under-predict 
their expected income growth.  These households will be consistently revising their consumption 
downward with each ‘unlucky’ income draw.   As a result, their consumption growth will be 
lower, on average, than the other group of pre-retired households.   If this underestimate is 
constant over time within the low wealth residual grouping, the differences in expectations will 
be captured by the inclusion of D<20 into the estimating equation.  In other words, the estimation 






+ |  D<20) = 0.  The two 
groups could have different, non-zero ex-post mean realized shocks.   However, in order for (7) 
to be valid, the shocks must be i.i.d within each group.   This assumption is not much different 
than the standard assumption that ε*i,t+k is i.i.d. for the full sample.  Therefore, the inclusion of 
D<20 allows the two groups to have different mean expected shocks, on average.  As long as the 
shocks are i.i.d. within each group, the instruments for the predictable component of income 
growth will be orthogonal to the error term within each group. 
  Two further comments can be made about the identification assumptions.   First, we can 
directly test to see if the income processes differ between the two groups by regressing current 
income growth on lags of income growth and those lags interacted with D<20.  If the two groups 
have different income processes, the interaction terms would enter significantly.  There is no 
evidence that the two groups have different income processes.  The coefficients on the  
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interaction terms in such a regression were essentially zero and no interacted term was 
statistically different from zero.  Furthermore, the joint test of significance on the interacted 
terms could not reject that the two income processes were similar.  Second, this result should not 
be surprising.  By definition, the low wealth residual households and the high wealth residual 
households are identical along all observables including actual income shocks (unemployment 
spells) and expected income shocks (education/occupation/industry interactions) (see Table 1). 
Given the way the sample was split in regression (1), there should be no reason to believe that 
the expected income processes differ between the two groups of pre-retired households.
18   
B. Estimation  Results 
  Equation (7) is estimated on data from 1975–1987 for the sample of PSID households who 
were ‘pre-retired’ in 1989.  Formally, consumption growth is defined as the change in log annual 
food expenditures between year t and year t+1.
19   See the Data Appendix for a full discussion of 
the creation of household real consumption growth and household real after-tax interest rates.  
  When estimating (7), I instrument for the predictable component of household labor income 
growth using 4 lags of household labor income growth, excluding the first lag.  If household 
labor income growth follows an autoregressive or moving average process, past labor income 
growth will have predictive power in determining expected future labor income growth.  As 
noted above, I allow the income processes to differ accordingly between the two different groups 
of pre-retired households.  A first stage regression of current household labor income growth on 
                                                      
18  For all estimations reported in Tables 3-5, the income processes were estimated separately for each group.  All the regressions 
were re-estimated forcing both groups to have the same income process.  As expected, given the above discussion, there was no 
difference in results between the two procedures.   
19  Food consumption in the PSID, used by many authors to estimate consumption Euler equations, is a good measure to test 
household consumption behavior.  First, food consumption has little aspects of durability.  Second, because households can 
substitute away from eating in restaurants or from buying more expensive brands, food consumption will be sensitive to changes 
in income.  To the extent there is habit formation in food consumption or if food consumption responds little to income changes, 
the estimation of (7) will be biased against finding significant coefficients on β1 and β2.  
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four lags of household labor income growth shows that the lags have strong predictive power 
both for households who have wealth residuals in the top 80%  (F-statistic = 10.7, p-value < 
0.01) and for households who have 1989 wealth residuals in the bottom 20% (F-statistic = 4.2, p-
value < 0.01).     
  Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (7).  If both the low residual and high 
residual groups followed standard PIH consumption rules, then both β1 and β2 would equal zero.  
If the low residual wealth groups followed a similar consumption plan as the high wealth 
residual group, β2 would equal zero, regardless of the value of β1.   Table 3 reports that β1, the 
coefficient on the predictable change in income for the whole sample, is negative and not 
statistically different from zero.  β2, however, is large, positive, and statistically different from 
zero.  Households who had little pre-retirement wealth relative to their lifecycle characteristics 
responded positively to predictable income changes.  The model predicts that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of predictable income changes is 56 percentage points higher for 
households with lower than normal pre-retirement wealth (t-statistic = 2.0).    The net response to 
predictable income changes for the low residual group (β1 + β2) is positive (an estimated 
marginal propensity to consume of 0.40) and statistically different from zero (p-value 0.06). 
  In summary, the results of this section show that households who display behavior that is 
inconsistent with the permanent income hypothesis as they transition into retirement also display 
behavior that is inconsistent with the permanent income hypothesis during their working lives.   
IV. Robustness  Specifications 
  The results in section III suggest that pre-retired households residing in the lowest twenty 
percent of the normalized wealth distribution have different consumption behavior during their 
working years than other households with similar economic histories.  Is the difference in  
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consumption behavior due to liquidity constraints?  How sensitive are the results to the choice of 
a 20% wealth residual cutoff?  Are the findings in section III robust to changes in the sample 
selection criteria?  In this section, all of these questions are explored.  
A.  Empirically Testing for the Existence of Binding Liquidity Constraints  
  If market imperfections prevent households from borrowing when expected income growth 
is positive, predictable income growth will have statistical power in predicting consumption 
growth.  The lower the household wealth, the more likely the household will be liquidity 
constrained.  However, as noted by Altonji and Siow (1987), Zeldes (1989) and Shea (1995), it is 
possible to empirically test whether the existence of liquidity constraints is driving the rejection 
of the Permanent Income Hypothesis in micro data.  Liquidity constraints prevent a household 
from borrowing but do not place any restrictions on a household’s ability to save.  As a result, 
the consumption growth of liquidity constrained households should only respond to predictable 
increases in income, but not predictable income declines.   If households truly expect their 
income to decline, they could save a percentage of their income today so as to fund consumption 
in the future, leaving their discounted marginal utility of consumption unchanged.  
  To test whether liquidity constraints are causing the rejection of the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis, the following equation can be estimated: 
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where DUp and DDown are dummy variables indicating whether the household’s predicted income 
growth between t and t+1 was positive or negative, respectively.   Table 4 reports the results of  
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estimating equation (8).  If liquidity constraints were driving the failure of the permanent income 
hypothesis for the low wealth residual households, the consumption of the household would 
respond to predictable income increases but not predictable income declines.  In other words, β5 
would be positive and β6 would be equal to zero.  Table 4 shows that the low residual households 
respond equally to predictable income increases and to predictable income declines.   Such a 
result suggests that liquidity constraints are not driving the rejection of the permanent income 
hypothesis. 
  This should not be surprising.  By definition, the two groups of households had earned 
similar levels of labor income over their lives.  If one group was liquidity constrained while 
young, their consumption over that time period should have been lower, all else equal.  This 
implies that liquidity constrained households will show up in retirement with higher wealth, not 
lower wealth.  The fact that a household has low normalized wealth at retirement suggests 
against liquidity constraints while young. 
B. Alternate  Specifications  of  Low Wealth Residual Households 
  The results in Tables 3 and 4 compare the consumption behavior of those households with 
the lowest twenty percent of 1989 pre-retirement wealth residuals to the consumption behavior 
of all other pre-retired households.  There is nothing magical about the twenty percent cutoff.  
One question of interest is how robust are the findings in Tables 3 and 4 to alternate definitions 
of ‘lower than normal’ pre-retirement wealth.  Table 5 explores this question.   
  Instead of defining the low pre-retirement wealth residual cutoff as an absolute cutoff, the 
responsiveness to predictable income changes are allowed to differ by residual deciles.   
Specifically, households are grouped together based upon having pre-retirement residuals 
(estimated from the first stage regression discussed in section II) in the following ranges:  0-10%,  
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10%-20%, 20%-30%, 30%-40%, 40%-50%, and greater than 50%.   Such a specification allows 
for a non-linear consumption response to predictable income changes depending on the wealth 
residuals.    Additionally, with such a specification one can see whether the responsiveness of 
consumption growth to predictable income shocks increases as the wealth residuals become more 
negative.   
  Table 5 reports the results of this specification.   Households with wealth residuals in the 
bottom 10% of the distribution respond the strongest to predictable income changes; the 
marginal propensity to consume out of predictable income shocks is 0.67 (0.93-0.26) with a p-
value = 0.07.   Households with residuals in the 10
th-20
th percentile also respond positively to 
predictable income changes, although the responsiveness was much smaller and not statistically 
different from zero; 0.08 (0.34 – 0.26), p-value = 0.34.   It is worth noting that those in the 10
th-
20
th percentile of the wealth residual distribution did respond differently than those in the top ½ 
of the wealth residual distribution (coefficient = 0.34, p-value = 0.05).   Households in the other 






th) did not respond in any way that was 
economically or statistically different than households with higher wealth residuals.   It is 
concluded that somewhere between 10-20% of the pre-retired wealth distribution have lower 
than normal pre-retirement wealth and have consumption profiles that respond to predictable 
changes in income.  In other words, the twenty percent cutoff used in the early parts of the paper 
was well-justified. 
C.  Redefining the Sample Splitting Equation 
  As discussed in Section II, given the sample selection procedure, the results may be biased 
against finding grasshopper behavior.  For example, the X and Z controls in regression (1) are 
likely correlated with poor planning on the part of the household.  Households who do not go to  
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college may plan less for the future than households who go to graduate school.  By including 
education dummies as controls when estimating (1), some differences in planning propensities 
across households will be purged from the residuals.  To examine the impact of including such 
controls in the sample selection equation, two samples are isolated using the actual wealth 
distribution as opposed to the residual wealth distribution.  This procedure is the same as 
including no X or Z controls when estimating (1).  As noted in section II, including many 
controls has a distinct advantage.  The PIH theory says that households who experience different 
economic, demographic and health trajectories should have different consumption and saving 
patterns entering retirement.  Using the X and Z controls creates households who are similar 
along all the X and Z dimensions but differ in wealth.  However, it can still be illustrative to 
examine the results when no controls are used when splitting the sample.   
  To start, equation (7) is re-estimated with D*<20 is replaced by D<20, where D*<20 is defined 
to include all pre-retired households in the bottom 20% of the actual 1989 log wealth distribution 
(as opposed to the normalized log wealth residual distribution).  The overlap of households in 
both D*<20 and D<20 is 76%.   This implies that the actual wealth levels of most households in 
the left tail of the wealth distribution cannot be explained by the X and Z controls.  Given the 
high overlap of households in the normalized and actual wealth groupings, it is not surprising 
that the results do not change when (7) is re-estimated using D*<20 instead of D<20.   The 
estimate of β1 was -0.22 (standard error = 0.16) and the estimate of β2 was 0.85 (p-value = 0.09).  
Using the same procedure to get the results presented in Table 5, it is found that between 20 and 
30% of households with the lowest wealth residual respond to predictable income changes.   In 
other words, slightly more households behave as the proverbial grasshopper using the method 
with no first stage controls.    
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V. Interpretation 
  The results in sections II – IV show that there is a link between household retirement wealth 
and their consumption while young.  Specifically, a set of facts are presented which describe two 
different types of households.  First, there is a segment of households who enter retirement with 
very low wealth even after controlling for differences in income, demographic, employment and 
health histories.  Second, these same households experience a large consumption decline at the 
onset of retirement, relative to other pre-retired households.  Third, these households have 
consumption profiles that respond to predictable income shocks throughout their working years.  
Differences in observables do not explain differences between these groups.  These households, 
by construction, are identical along income, employment, demographic, and health dimensions.  
While it is found that a majority of households behave as predicted by the standard permanent 
income hypothesis, a subset of households (roughly 10-20% of the population) have 
consumption and saving behavior that is inconsistent with such a theory.  The goal, then, is to 
explain the behavior of this latter group of households. 
  Many alternative theories can explain a subset of the above facts, but very few theories can 
jointly explain them all.  For example, the results described above for low wealth residual 
households are inconsistent with models of consumption habits or precautionary savings.  While 
both of those theories could predict excess sensitivity in consumption to predictable income 
changes during a households working years, neither would predict such a sharp decline in 
consumption upon retirement.  To the contrary, standard models of consumption habits (Deaton, 
1992) predict that consumption will decline less slowly during retirement for those households 
with habit preferences, compared to PIH households, all else equal.  Furthermore, there is 
nothing to suggest that models of habit persistence in consumption would lead households to  
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have extremely low levels of wealth upon retirement.   Precautionary models of saving may 
predict low pre-retirement savings along with the excess sensitivity of consumption, but such 
households would still smooth their consumption across the period of retirement (Gourichas and 
Parker, 2000).  Also, differences in time preferences across households cannot alone generate the 
above findings.  It is true that households with a high, constant time discount rate will enter 
retirement with little wealth, relative to households with similar income profiles and a lower time 
discount rate.  However, such household will still smooth the marginal utility of consumption 
over time.  These households will have consumption profiles that would not respond to 
predictable income changes, including retirement.  
  A strong substitutability between leisure and consumption could reconcile the main results 
outlined above.  Leisure is high in both retirement and periods of job loss.  Households who treat 
consumption and leisure as substitutes would optimally plan for lower consumption in retirement 
and, as a result, would save less during their working years.  Furthermore, as the household 
became retired, and leisure increased, we would expect a sharp decline in consumption if the 
household was smoothing total utility and not just consumption.  Lastly, these households would 
optimally choose to have a positive correlation between predictable income movements and 
consumption while young, if the predictable income changes were associated with a change in 
leisure (such as job loss).  When leisure is low, consumption would be high and when leisure is 
high, consumption would be low.
20  To explore whether the substitutability between leisure and 
consumption is causing the failure of the permanent income tests, changes in total hours worked 
by both the household head and wife (if present) were included directly into the estimation of 
regressions (7) and (8).  This procedure is similar to that used by Attanasio and Browning (1995) 
to test for the substitutability of consumption and leisure.   The results reported in Tables 3-5 
                                                      
20 See Attanasio and Browning (1995) for a discussion.  
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were essentially unchanged with the inclusion of work hours into the estimation equation.   Such 
a finding suggests that the substitutability between consumption and leisure is not causing the 
failure of the permanent income hypothesis documented above. 
  There are two possible types of behavior that are consistent with all of the results above.  
First, households who follow myopic (rule-of-thumb) consumption rules would have 
consumption that closely tracks income (Campbell and Mankiw, 1987).  If households do not 
plan for the future they will end up in retirement with little wealth, be forced to take a 
consumption decline upon retirement, and will have consumption profiles that respond to 
predictable income changes during their working years.  Second, a theory of time inconsistent 
preferences can match the above facts.   Such households may want to plan for the future, but are 
incapable of doing so; these households have relatively high discount rates over short horizons 
and relatively low discount rates over longer horizons.  This discount structure sets up a conflict 
between today’s preferences (which prefer current consumption), and the preferences that will be 
held in the future (which prefer that they had deferred consumption in the past).  A household 
may realize that retirement is coming, yet in each period the household would choose to 
postpone saving for retirement until the next period.  Eventually, the household could enter 
retirement with little accumulated wealth, and as a result, consumption would eventually have to 
decline.  Furthermore, consumers with time inconsistent preferences could have consumption 
growth that responds to both predictable income increases and predictable income declines 
(Laibson, 1997) and could have consumption that falls sharply at the time of retirement 
(Angeletos et al., 2000).    
  While both the rule of thumb and the time inconsistent preference theories can reconcile the 
behavior of households with low wealth residuals, it is not possible to disentangle the two  
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theories.  Specifically, it is not possible to distinguish whether these identified household are 
completely myopic with respect to their consumption decisions or whether they would like to 
plan for the future, but are incapable of doing so.  However, certain types of consumers with time 
inconsistent preferences can be ruled out.  Laibson (1997) and Angelitos et. al. (2000) draw 
distinctions between ‘sophisticated hyperbolic consumers’ and ‘naïve hyperbolic consumers’.  
The former group is aware of their time inconsistent preferences while the latter is not.   
Sophisticated hyperbolic consumers will take steps to commit themselves to saving.  Such 
households, knowing their desire to reduce saving and increase consumption, will shift their 
savings toward illiquid assets (i.e., real estate, business or pension).   
  There is no evidence among the low pre-retirement wealth residual households to suggest 
that they are trying to commit themselves to save.  Actually, the results suggest the opposite.  
Only 56% of the pre-retired, low wealth residual households (those in the bottom 20% of the 
wealth residual distribution) own any ‘illiquid’ assets, where liquid assets are defined as the sum 
of housing, other real estate and business equity.  The comparable number for the other pre-
retired households was over 90%.   Furthermore, the median fraction of household wealth in 
these illiquid assets is much smaller for those households with low pre-retirement wealth 
residuals (0.23 vs. 0.66).  If the households with low pre-retirement wealth residuals have time 
inconsistent preferences, they are not taking actions to commit themselves to save for the future.   
  In conclusion, there exists at least two different types of consumers in the population; those 
that plan for the future and those that do not plan for the future. In future work, it would be 
useful to understand whether such households simply do not plan for the future (are myopic) or 
do plan for the future, but are unable to commit themselves to save (have time inconsistent 
preferences).    
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VI.  The Self-Awareness of Economic Grasshoppers 
  There is one final piece of evidence that suggests pre-retired households in 1989 who had 
lower than normal wealth did so because of poor planning.  In 1972 and 1975, the PSID asked its 
respondents to self assess many of their socio-economic characteristics.   Some of the questions 
asked of PSID respondents included:  whether they get angry easily, whether they are concerned 
about failure, whether they feel life will work out, whether they have control over life, and 
whether they are satisfied with themselves.  There were three questions asked as part of these 
supplements that directly pertained to a household’s consumption-savings tradeoff and the 
household’s willingness to plan for the future.  Specifically, the questions were: 
1.  Are you the kind of person that plans his life ahead all the time or do you live more from 
day-to-day? 
2.  When you make plans ahead, do you usually carry out things the way you expected? 
3.  Would you rather spend your money and enjoy life today or save more for the future? 
 
The first question was asked in both 1972 and 1975, while the second and third questions were 
only asked in 1972.  The questions above are inherently vague about what they were intended to 
measure.  I do not want to claim that the answers to such questions are in any way indicative of 
the household’s actual behavior.  I do, however, believe that the answers to such questions may 
provide some suggestive evidence about how the two groups of pre-retired households studied 
above assess their own behavior. 
  As noted earlier, most of the pre-retired PSID households in 1989 were in the PSID since its 
inception in 1968 and, as a result, provided answers to the self-assessment questions in both 
1972 and 1975.  The results are reported in Table 6.  Responses were compared between 
households with low normalized pre-retirement wealth residuals (bottom 20%) and all other 
households.  The sample split is identical to the one described in Table 1.  As expected,  
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households with lower than normal pre-retirement wealth were much less likely to classify 
themselves as planners in 1972 (46% for the low wealth residual households vs. 59% for the 
higher wealth residuals, p-value of difference = 0.06).  The results are even more striking in 
1975.  Households with lower than normal pre-retirement wealth in 1989 only reported 
themselves to be a planner 38% of the time (compared to 56% of the time for the other 1989 pre-
retired households).   In 1972, only 54% of the low wealth residual households said that they 
were likely to carry out plans as expected.  The other pre-retired households in 1989 said that 
they carried out their plans 67% of the time.  All these differences were significant at the ninety-
four percent level of confidence.   
  Perhaps the most interesting question is the one that most directly assesses the household’s 
consumptions decisions.  Of the households with the lowest 1989 pre-retirement wealth 
residuals, 60% of them reported in 1972 preferring spending money today (as opposed to saving 
it for the future).  The comparable number for the other 1989 pre-retired households was only 
40%.  While only suggestive, it appears that those households who behave most like the 
proverbial ‘economic grasshopper’ are aware of their grasshopper tendencies.  Such households 
report being less likely to plan for their future, less likely to carry out plans conditional on 
making them, and more likely to spend their money today rather than save it for the future.  One 
should not forget that these self-assessments were made almost two decades prior to when their 
pre-retirement wealth was measured. 
  There are two other questions in the early PSID surveys that are worth reporting.  The first 
question asked households whether or not they had any positive savings.  The second asked if the 
household had accumulated savings greater than two months of income.  These questions were 
asked both in 1972 and 1975.   The responses to these questions for our 1989 pre-retired  
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households are also reported in Table 6.  Not surprisingly, households who under-saved entering 
retirement were low savers throughout their early working years.  For example, in 1972, only 
30% of those pre-retired households with wealth residuals in the bottom twenty percent of the 
wealth distribution had two months worth of accumulated savings.  Over ½ of the other pre-
retired households had at least two months of accumulated savings.   Households who have 
lower than normal wealth entering retirement were much less likely to have had any significant 
amount of saving early in their lifecycle. 
VI.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, it is shown that households who enter retirement with low wealth consistently 
followed non permanent income consumption rules during their working years.  Using the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), household wealth in 1989 is predicted for a sample of 50-65 
year olds using both current and past income, occupation, demographic, employment, and health 
characteristics.   Using the residuals from this first stage regression, the sample of pre-retired 
households is subsetted into households who save ‘lower’ than predicted and all other 
households.  By construction, these households had similar opportunities to save; the average 
household in both these sub-samples are identical along all observable income and demographic 
characteristics.  It is then shown that households in the low wealth residual sample had much 
larger declines in consumption upon retirement.  Such a result is consistent with the household 
not adequately planning for retirement.   
  In the main part of the paper, the panel component of the PSID is used to analyze the 
consumption behavior of these households early in their lifecycle.  It is shown that these low pre-
retirement wealth households had consumption growth that responded to predictable changes in 
income during their early working years.  No such behavior was found among the other pre- 
  33
retired households.  Moreover, the low residual households responded both to predictable income 
increases as well as predictable income declines, a result that is inconsistent with a liquidity 
constraints explanation.   It is also shown that the set of facts presented about households with 
low pre-retirement wealth residuals are inconsistent with theories of habit formation or 
precautionary saving.  Lastly, these results are not caused by the households treating 
consumption and leisure as substitutes. 
  There are two theories that can explain all of the behaviors associated with low wealth 
residual households.  First, households who follow myopic (rule-of-thumb) consumption rules 
would have consumption that closely tracks income.  If households do not plan for the future 
they will end up in retirement with little wealth, be forced to take a consumption decline upon 
retirement, and will have consumption profiles that respond to predictable income changes 
during their working years.  Second, the results could be reconciled if the household had time 
inconsistent preferences.   Such households may want to plan for the future, but are incapable of 
doing so.  There is no evidence, however, that these households had taken steps to commit 
themselves to saving for the future.  While both the rule of thumb and the time inconsistent 
preference theories can reconcile the behavior of households with low wealth residuals, it is not 
possible to disentangle the two theories.  Specifically, given PSID data, it is not possible to 
distinguish whether these identified household are completely myopic with respect to their 
consumption decisions or whether they would like to plan for the future, but are incapable of 
doing so.  Regardless, the near sighted behavior of both types of households leaves them ill 
prepared to sustain consumption through retirement.   
  At the beginning of the paper, a classic fable by Aesop is recounted.   In the fable, a sharp 
distinction is drawn between ants, who saved during their summer (i.e., working years) to sustain  
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consumption during their winter (i.e., retirement), and grasshoppers, who saved little for their 
future period of low earnings.  The results shown in this paper confirm Aesop’s proposition; 
within an economy, consumers are of different types.  Some households are forward looking and 
behave according to the Permanent Income Hypothesis.  Others, however, lack either the desire 
or the ability to plan for the future.  When constructing economic models, it is often misguided to 
assume all households follow similar consumption rules.  With respect to retirement saving, 
while it is true that the majority of households appear to follow permanent income consumption 
rules, approximately 20% of the population behaves as ‘economic grasshoppers’.    In future 
work, it would be useful to understand the reasons why households do not plan for the future.    
Exploring the origins of such households could also be fruitful.  Are households born of a given 
type or do they evolve as their life progresses?  
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  In this appendix, the controls included in the estimation of equation (1) are discussed.  After 
which, the construction of the after tax interest rate and the household’s consumption growth 
rate, included in the estimation of equations (7) and (8) are detailed. 
  Regression equation (1) included a vector of 1989 household controls, Xi,1989, and a vector of 
historical, pre-1989 controls, Zi,historical.   The specific controls included in the X vector were:    
•  a quadratic in the household head’s age,  
 
•  a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is black,  
 
•  a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is currently married,  
 
•  the number of children in the family unit,  
 
•  the number of children between the ages of 13-17 (living within or away from the 
household),  
 
•  the number of children between the ages of 18 and 21 (living within or away from 
the household),   
 
•  a dummy equal to 1 if the head had less than a high school degree,  
 
•  a dummy equal to 1 if the head had exactly a high school degree,  
 
•  a dummy equal to 1 if the head had some college education (but no college degree)  
(household heads with four or more years of college was the excluded group),   
 
•  dummy variables indicating the census region where the household resides,  
 
•  a vector of one digit occupation dummies, 
 
•  a vector of one digit industry dummies, 
 
•  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the head was unemployed, 
 
•  and, a quadratic in household labor income, where household labor income is 
defined as the sum of  labor earnings of both the head and spouse, if a spouse was 
present.  
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  Additionally, the PSID asked the following question of both heads and spouses to ascertain 
individual health status:  “Would you say your (Head’s/Wife’s) health in general is excellent, 
very good, good, fair, or poor?”.  If the individual responded that their health was fair or poor, 
the individual was coded as having “bad health”.  1989 “bad health dummies” were included for 
both the head and the wife.   
  Lastly, two questions were asked in 1989 about household pensions.  First, households were 
asked the following question about their pension replacement rates:   
“We're interested in how much of earnings will be replaced by pensions.  Thinking of your 
(and your (wife's/"WIFE'S")) total pension benefits when you (both) retire, including Social  
Security, how will they compare with your (and your (wife's/"WIFE'S")) pre-retirement 
earnings--I mean, about what percent of your pre-retirement earnings will they be?”     
 
The response to this question was included as part of the X vector of controls.  Secondly, 
equation (1) also included the amount that households directly contributed to their pension 
during the previous 5 years.  In other specifications (not reported), occupation, industry and 
education controls were interacted.  These interactions had no affect on the results and, as a 
result, were omitted from the main specification discussed in the text. 
  The Z vector included pre-1989 controls including:   
•  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head had any “bad health” between 1980 
and 1988,  
 
•  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spouse had any “bad health” between 1980 and 1988,  
 
•   the number of years of “bad health” reported for both the head and the spouse between 
1980 and 1988, 
 
•  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head become divorced anytime between 
1980 and 1988, 
 
•  a quadratic in average family labor income between 1980 and 1988,  
 
•  the change in family labor income between 1980 and 1988,  
 
•  the coefficient of variation of income between 1975 and 1989,  
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•  a dummy variable indicating whether the household head was ever unemployed between 
1980 and 1988, 
 
•  and the total duration of unemployment spells (in weeks) of the household head between 
1980 and 1988. 
 
For completeness, income and employment controls from the 1970s were included in many of 
the regression specifications.  These controls added little to the predictive power of regression 
(1).  Including income and employment controls from the 1970s did not alter the reported results 
in any way. 
  When estimating equation (7), a measure of consumption growth and the after tax interest 
rate must be constructed.  Consumption growth is defined as the percentage increase in annual 
food expenditures between year t and year t+1.  The PSID annually collects information on the 
cost of food consumed at home, the amount spent away from home in restaurants and the value 
of food purchased with food stamps.   Aside from the potential measurement error in the 
reporting of consumption data, researchers also must deal with the potential uncertainty 
surrounding the time period to which the respondents’ answers refer.  Questions dealing with the 
amount of non-food stamp consumption the household undertakes in an average week are asked 
primarily during April through August of each year, with the median interview date occurring in 
June.   To obtain an estimate of annual food consumption flow, the PSID editors multiply this 
response by 52.   A potentially important question is the time frame used by consumers in 
determining average consumption since that will determine the appropriate timing of the interest 
rate, current consumption, consumption growth and the relevant income growth.  All food 
consumption reported during the early summer of year t is assumed to apply to all of year t.   
  Formally, a household’s after-tax interest rate can be expressed as ri,t+1 = rt+1




tbill equals the average nominal rate on a one year treasury starting in June of year  
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t, τt+1 equals household i’s marginal tax rate in year t+1, and π
e
t+1 is the expected inflation rate 
between t and t+1.  The PSID, during this sample period, reports the household’s marginal tax 
rate computed on the basis of detailed income data and the relevant tax tables.  It is assumed that 
households have perfect foresight with respect to their future marginal tax rates.  Because 
inflation is unpredictable, the household in period t may not know the real rate that it will face 
between  t and t+1.  Using the actual inflation rate between t and t+1 may bias estimated 
coefficients because of the potential correlation with the error term.  To account for this, most 
researchers use the actual inflation rate when calculating the return and instrument using lagged 
inflation rates.  Instead, I calculate the household’s expected borrowing rate using the Livingston 
Inflation Forecast, where the forecast runs from June of year t to June of year t+1.  The 
Livingston Survey of Inflation Forecasts is maintained by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve.  All 
values were converted into 1989 dollars.  This methodology for computing after-tax interest rates 
and consumption growth rates is similar to most authors who use the PSID data to estimate 
consumption Euler equations (see Shapiro, 1984;  Zeldes, 1989; and Shea, 1995).    
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Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics for Two Sub Samples of Pre-Retired Households:  
Bottom 20% of 1989 Wealth Residuals and Top 80% of 1989 Wealth Residuals 
           















p-value of  
difference 
Column I and 
II 
     
Wealth Distribution and Portfolio Composition     
25
th percentile of Household Wealth  $28,900  $2,014  <0.01 
Median Household Wealth  $83,150  $8,275  <0.01 
75
th percentile of Household Wealth  $205,500  $29,954  <0.01 
% Owning Home  0.77  0.43  <0.01 
% Owning Stocks   0.31  0.12  <0.01 
% Owning Business  0.19  0.03  <0.01 
     
Demographics     
Age of Head in 1989  57  57  0.30 
Dummy:  Marital Status in 1989  0.68  0.58  0.02 
Dummy:  Divorced Anytime 1980 – 1988  0.11  0.12  0.50 
Dummy:  Race of Head in 1989 (Black = 1)  0.10 0.13 0.35 
Dummy:  Education in 1989 12 years or less  0.48  0.55  0.22 
Dummy:  Have Children Aged  1– 5 in 1989  0.03  0.01  0.09 
Dummy:  Have Children Aged 6 – 13 in 1989  0.06  0.05  0.65 
Dummy:  Have Children Aged 14 - 20 in 1989  0.20  0.20  0.91 
Number of People in Household  2.4  2.2  0.25 
     
Labor Income and Labor Income Variability     
Mean Family Labor Income in 1989  $39,947  $39,790  0.98 
Mean Family Labor Income: 1980-1989  $37,793  $35,260  0.49 
Change in Family Labor Income:  1980 to 1989  $4,349  $6,949  0.62 
% Heads Unemployed in 1989  0.04  0.03  0.66 
% Heads Unemployed Anytime 1980-1988  0.21  0.23  0.60 
Median Coefficient of Variation of Income:  1975-1989  0.51  0.53  0.21 
     
Health Shocks     
% With Head ‘Bad Health’ in 1989   0.19  0.25  0.10 
% With Head ‘Bad Health’ Anytime 1980-1988  0.33  0.39  0.14 
% With Wife ‘Bad Health’ in 1989  0.11  0.09  0.52 
% With Wife ‘Bad Health’ Anytime 1980-1988   0.22  0.24  0.68 
     
Retirement Pension     
% of 1989 Income Replaced During  Retirement  0.54 0.52 0.66 
     
Consumption     
Mean Household Food Consumption:  1980-1987  $4,125  $3,901  0.25 
Mean Household Food Consumption:  1975-1979  $3,481  $3,264  0.13 
Med. Coefficient of Variation of Consumption: 1975-87  0.37  0.41  0.13 
     
Notes:  The sample was split using the residuals from a first stage regression of 1989 household log wealth on a vector 
of household observables. The sample included all non-retired households aged 50-65 in the 1989 wave of the PSID 
(819 households).  All dollar values are in 1989 dollars.  
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Table 2 
Average Age of Retirement and Consumption Decline Upon Retirement, 
By 1989 Wealth Residual Groups 
 
   











p-value of  
difference 
Column I and 
II 
     
Average Age of Retirement  62.4 62.3 0.99 
     
Average Yearly Food Consumption Prior to 
Retirement   
$4,045 $3,700  0.39 
     
Average Yearly Food Consumption After 
Retirement 
a 
$3,744 $2,913  <0.01 
     
Average Percentage Point Decline in 
Consumption At Retirement 
b 
-0.03 -0.11 0.14 
     
Median Percentage Point Decline in 
Consumption At Retirement 
c 
-0.11 -0.19 0.40 
     
 
a  Yearly Food Consumption Prior to Retirement is defined as the household’s food consumption averaged over the 
three years prior to retirement. 
b  Yearly Food Consumption After Retirement is defined as the household’s food consumption averaged over the three 
years after retirement.   
c Average Percentage Point Decline in Consumption At Retirement is computed for each household and then averaged 
over households.  
 
Notes:  Sample includes all non-retired households aged 50-65 in the 1989 wave of the PSID, who were subsequently 
retired between 1990 and 1999.  The sample size included 267 high wealth residual households (column I) and 51 low 
wealth residual households (column II).   The wealth residuals are defined as in Table 1.  Retirement Age is defined as 
the first year that the household self-reports being retired.   To compute the consumption statistics in this table, the 
top/bottom 5% of outliers in the change in consumption distribution were truncated.  All dollar amounts reported in 







Table 3:   Responsiveness of Early Life Consumption to Predictable Income Changes, 







   
Predictable Income Growth, All Households (β1) -0.16 
  (0.15) 
   
Predictable Income Growth, Low Wealth Residual Households (β2) 0.56 
  (0.28) 
   
   
 
Notes:   This table reports the estimates of the response of household consumption growth to predictable income 
changes (equation (7) in text).  β1 is the coefficient on predictable income changes for the full sample.  β2 is the 
coefficient on predictable income changes for households with low first stage wealth residuals.  All other estimated 
coefficients were suppressed.  Households with low first stage wealth residuals are defined to be pre-retired households 
between the age of 50 and 65 who had wealth residuals in the bottom 20% of the wealth residual distribution.  See 
footnote to Table 1 for additional details.  Households for which their one year consumption growth was in excess of 
50% or less than -33% were excluded from the sample. The household was only excluded from the sample for that 
given year.  These sample restrictions left 4,668 observations, based on 727 households. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) were adjusted for within household heterogeneity.  The equation was estimated using two-stage least 
squared where the predictable component of household labor income growth was instrumented for using four lags of 
household labor income growth (excluding the first lag). The income processes was estimated separately for low wealth 




Table 4:   Responsiveness of Early Life Consumption to Predictable Income Changes, 
Testing For Liquidity Constraints 
 





   
Predictable Income Increase, All Households (β3) -0.11 
  (0.25) 
   
Predictable Income Decline, All Households (β4) -0.01 
  (0.29) 
   
Predictable Income Increase, Low Wealth Residual Households (β5) 0.35 
  (0.14) 
   
Predictable Income Increase, Low Wealth Residual Households (β6) 0.31 
  (0.17) 
   
   
 
Notes:   This table reports the estimates of the response of household consumption growth to predictable income 
increases and to predictable income declines (equation (8) in text).  β3 is the coefficient on predictable income increases 
for the full sample.  β4 is the coefficient on predictable income declines for the full sample.  β5 and β6 are the 
coefficients on predictable income increases and predictable income declines for households with low first stage wealth 
residuals.  All other coefficients were suppressed.  Households with low first stage wealth residuals are defined to be 
pre-retired households between the age of 50 and 65 who had wealth residuals in the bottom 20% of the wealth residual 
distribution.  See footnote to Table 1 for additional details.   Households for which their one year consumption growth 
was in excess of 50% or less than -33% were excluded from the sample. The household was only excluded from the 
sample for that given year.  These sample restrictions left 4,668 observations, based on 727 households. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) were adjusted for within household heterogeneity.  The equation was estimated using two-stage least 
squared where the predictable component of household labor income growth was instrumented for using four lags of 
household labor income growth (excluding the first lag). The income processes was estimated separately for low wealth 




Responsiveness of Early Life Consumption to Predictable Income Changes, Additive 








Predictable Income Change, All Households  -0.26 
(0.16) 
   
Predictable Income Change, Households with 0-10
th percentile wealth residuals  0.93 
(0.45) 
   
Predictable Income Change, Households with 10-20
th percentile wealth residuals  0.34 
(0.17) 
   
Predictable Income Change, Households with 20-30
th percentile wealth residuals  0.14 
(0.19) 
   
Predictable Income Change, Households with 30-40
th percentile wealth residuals  -0.29 
(0.25) 
   
Predictable Income Change, Households with 40-50
th percentile wealth residuals  -0.18 
(0.29) 
   
  
 
Notes:   This table reports the estimates of the response of household consumption growth to predictable income 
changes.  The predictable income changes are interacted with five different dummy variables corresponding to the 
household’s 1989 wealth residua.  All five dummy variables interacted with predictable income changes were included 
in the regression simultaneously.  The five dummy variables indicated whether the household had 1989 wealth 
residuals in the:  0-10
th percentile, the 10
th-20
th percentile, the 20
th-30
th percentile, the 30
th – 40
th percentile, and the 40
th 
– 50
th percentile.  All other coefficients from the regression were suppressed.  Households for which their one year 
consumption growth was in excess of 50% or less than -33% were excluded from the sample. The household was only 
excluded from the sample for that given year.  These sample restrictions left 4,668 observations, based on 727 
households. Standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for within household heterogeneity.  The equation was 
estimated using two-stage least squared where the predictable component of household labor income growth was 
instrumented for using four lags of household labor income growth (excluding the first lag). The income processes was 
estimated separately for each wealth residual group.    
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Table 6 
Household Response to Historical Saving Questions and to Subjective Self-Assessment of Planning and Spending Behavior: 
By 1989 Wealth Residual Groups 
                



















     
1972 Variables     
     
    % of households who describe themselves as being a planner (as opposed to living day-to-day).
a  0.59 0.46 0.06 
    % of households who describe themselves as likely to “carrying out plans”.
b    0.67 0.54 0.06 
    % of households who describe themselves as being a spender (as opposed to a saver).
c  0.41 0.60  <0.01 
    % of households in 1972 with any positive savings.  0.80  0.66  0.02 
    % of households in 1972 with accumulated savings greater than two months of income.  0.52  0.30  <0.01 
     
     
1975 Variables     
     
    % of households who describe themselves as being a planner (as opposed to living day-to-day).
a  0.56 0.38 0.01 
    % of households in 1975 with any positive savings.  0.80  0.74  0.25 
    % of households in 1975 with accumulated savings greater than two months of income.  0.48  0.29  <0.01 
     
Sample Size  500 127   
     
a PSID question reads:  “Are you the kind of person that plans his life ahead all the time or do you live more from day-to-day?” 
b PSID question reads: “When you make plans ahead, do you usually carry out things the way you expected?” 
c PSID question reads: “Would you rather spend your money and enjoy life today or save more for the future?” 
 
Notes:  All non-retired households between the age of 50 and 65 in the 1989 PSID who were in the sample during either 1972 or 1975 (627 households).  Subjective self 
assessment questions were asked only in the 1972 and 1975 waves of the PSID.  The 1972 set of questions were more extensive.  As a result, the ‘carry out plans” and the ‘saver 
versus spender’ questions were not asked in 1975.  Household response to the question were on a 1-5 scale, with 5 being agree strongly with the statement and 1 being disagree 





Appendix Table A1 
Average Age of Retirement and Consumption Decline Upon Retirement, 
By 1984 Wealth Residual Groups  
        















     
Average Age of Retirement  62.7 62.8 0.99 
     
Average Yearly Food Consumption Prior to 
Retirement 
a  
$4,238 $4,093  0.61 
     
Average Yearly Food Consumption After 
Retirement 
b 
$3,703 $3,122  0.02 
     
Average Percentage Point Decline in 
Consumption At Retirement 
c 
-0.08 -0.16 0.07 
     
Median Percentage Point Decline in 
Consumption At Retirement 
-0.13 -0.22 0.08 
     
 
a  Yearly Food Consumption Prior to Retirement is defined as the household’s food consumption averaged over the 
three years prior to retirement. 
b  Yearly Food Consumption After Retirement is defined as the household’s food consumption averaged over the three 
years after retirement.   
c Average Percentage Point Decline in Consumption At Retirement is computed for each household and then averaged 
over households.  
 
Notes:  Sample includes all non-retired households aged 50-65 in the 1984 wave of the PSID, who were subsequently 
retired between 1985 and 1999.  The sample size included 421 high wealth residual households (column I) and 91 low 
wealth residual households (column II).   The wealth residuals are defined as in Table 1, except using 1984 PSID 
households instead of 1989 PSID households.  Retirement Age is defined as the first year that the household self-
reports being retired.   To compute the consumption statistics in this table, the top/bottom 5% of outliers in the change 
in consumption distribution were truncated.  All dollar amounts reported in 1989 dollars.    
 Figure 1: Distribution of Wealth Residuals
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